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I. INTRODUCTION
More than seven years ago, the National Council on Public
Works Improvement was formed to study and assess the condition of
the nation's "infrastructure. '' 2 The Council's final report concluded
existing infrastructure could not sustain a stable, growing economy.
In fact, infrastructure growth was woefully insufficient to support
future economic growth and development, and capital investment was
sufficient to only offset annual depreciation, not to meet new
demand. The Council recommended a 100% increase in public
works capital expenditures in order to maintain existing services and
meet future needs. The Council's report came at a time when states
and municipalities were already faced with significant cutbacks in
federal allocations, the decreased availability of federal categorical
Alan M. Burger is a sole practitioner in Miami, Florida. Mr. Burger's practice
concentrates in Commercial Litigation and Real Estate and Real Estate Litigation. Mr.
Burger received his LL.M. in Real Property Development and Land Finance at the
University of Miami and his Juris Doctor from California Western School of Law. Mr.
Burger would like to thank Murray Greenberg, First Assistant County Attorney, Dade
County, Florida for his help and guidance and Ms. Dana Frydman.
2 Infrastructure is the support system of a community, including some twenty-two
different types of urban services and facilities.
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grant and loan programs, as well as the impact of the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act of 1985.'
Little has changed since the Council's report. Many would argue
increased federal expenditure restrictions have continued to impact
state and local capital expenditures. In light of current fiscal
constraints, state and local governments are forced to adopt
alternative and innovative strategies to raise and allocate public
funds. This trend was recognized by the Council when in its report
it stated that "mobilizing adequate financing requires participation by
all levels of government,"4 and in addition to taxation, requiring
innovative methods of financing. Suggested methods included
increased utilization of user fees, privatization, joint public/private
development projects as well as increased use of special
assessments. 5
This paper explores new ways in which the special assessment
may be used by local governments to alleviate growing infrastructure
deficiencies; the paper explores innovative assessment uses such as
indirect assessment benefits, the structuring of benefit districts to
indirectly benefit a nonassessed area; benefit swaps, the exchange of
assessment benefits between assessed areas; and benefit pools, the
contribution of assessment benefits into a pool in exchange for future
assessment benefits.
As a precursor to assessment alternatives, the realities of
legislative conditioning are explored because each of the proposed
assessment ideas involves legislative conditions. The
constitutionality of conditioning and special assessments are
discussed as a building block to determining if each of the new uses
are themselves constitutional. Finally, the political realities
surrounding the implementation of the assessment ideas are
considered.
3 Robert H. Freilich, et al., Federalism in Transition: The Emergence of New State
and Local Strategies in the Face of the Vanishing Tenth Amendment, 20 URB. LAw. 863,
873-874 (1988).
4 Id at 876.
5 Id.
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II. CAN AN ASSESSMENT BE CONDITIONED? 6
The process of enacting legislation is vastly different from the
process of conditioning legislative action upon an event. Legislative
enactment is the process by which laws are brought into effect. It
encompasses all influences upon the legislative process, including
conditions. Conditioned legislative action occurs when a legislative
act is premised upon a unilateral act by another. If this act is
deemed to be a delegation of the legislative role, the legislative act
and its process are unconstitutional.8 Thus, there is a fine line
between influence and bartering when a legislative act is premised
upon conditions. As a result, when a condition appears, inquiry must
be made to determine if the legislative process or the resulting
legislation is the conditioned event.
A. Conditions and Assessments
Since the power, the amount,9 the necessity and the
reasonableness of an assessment are legislative determinations,'0
judicial decisions regarding other legislative acts are analogous to
determine whether the implementation of an assessment for one
benefit area can be conditioned upon the provision of similar benefits
to other areas."
In Hartnett v. Austin, 2 the Florida Supreme Court held an
ordinance which conditioned its effectiveness upon the necessity for
the subsequent execution of a contract with private parties was vague
and imprecise, causing the act to be unconstitutional. 3  This
6 The enactment of each assessment alternative discussed in this paper is largely
dependant upon the conditioning of the legislative action upon some event.
7 Note, Municipal Development Exactions, The Rational Nexus Test, and the Federal
Constitution, 102 HARV. L. REv. 992, 1001-1002 (1989). United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
8 Bruce M. Kramer, Development Agreements: To What Extent Are They
Enforceable?, 10 REAL EST. L.J. 29, 45 (1981).
9 48 Fla. Jur. 2d Special Assessments § 4 (1984).
10 Id. at § 8.
1 This premise assumes that the conditioned action is not merely one of enactment,
but content. It further assumes that benefits derived are not at issue.
12 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956).
13 Id. at 88.
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holding did not per se establish that all conditioned legislative action
is invalid; rather, only when conditions are uncertain in nature is
legislative action invalid.
Hartnett was followed by Herr v. City of St. Petersburg,4 in
which the Florida Supreme Court upheld legislative action where a
public entity and a railroad 15 agreed to condition the reciprocal
payments upon future events. 16 Several factors weighed heavily in
the court's opinion in upholding the condition. First, unlike Hartnett,
this case involved two public entities; and second, each entity was
exercising its powers to further a public, not private purpose. The
court found this to be a primary factor in considering whether a
condition invalidates legislative action.
Thus, under Hartnett and Herr, legislative action may be
conditioned as long as it is predicated upon defined and certain
conditions. In addition, the entity responsible for performing, and
sponsoring the condition, must play an important role in validating
a condition. These holdings are consistent with the holdings of other
state courts and have been refined by the United States Supreme
Court. For example, state courts have upheld municipal exactions
which condition the issuance of a building permit upon developers'
provisions of public improvements. 17
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court also upheld such
exactions. In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,1
8
beachfront property owners granted a public easement for ocean
access. 9 The Supreme Court found that as long as there is a
"rational nexus" between condition and a legitimate purpose for the
condition, the condition is valid.2' The Court went on to hold,
14 114 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1959).
1S The court considered the railroad to be furthering the public welfare and as such
it was a public entity.
16 114 So. 2d at 174-175 (Fla. 1959).
17 See Martha Lester, Subdivision Exactions in Washington: The Controversy Over
Imposing Fees On Developers, 59 WASH. L. REv. 289 (1984); Stewart E. Sterk, Nolan,
Henry George, and Exactions, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1731 (1988); Note, Municipal
Developments Exactions, The Rational Nexus Test, and the Constitution, 102 HARV. L. REV.
992 (1989); John P. O'Connor, Jr., Extortion Loses a Synonym Thanks to Court Ordered
Accountability In Land Use Exaction Programs, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 397 (1988).
is Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
19 Id.
20 Id. at 837.
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however, that the condition imposed by the California Coastal
Commission did not meet the rational nexus test and therefore
constituted a taking.
Therefore under Nollan, Hartnett and Herr, the legislative
conditioning of assessment benefits would be valid as long as: (1)
The conditioning of the benefits meets the Nollan "rational nexus"
test, and (2) the assessment is itself valid. While these requirements
may appear to be separate, they are in fact interrelated with the
validity of the condition predicated upon the validity of the
assessment. Thus, there must be a sufficient relationship between the
assessment and benefits conferred 2' before demonstrating a
sufficient relationship between the assessment and the condition.
B. Validity of Assessments
The Florida Supreme Court classified assessment districts as
permanent or temporary in order to determine whether there is
sufficient benefit to property to justify imposition of a tax or an
assessment on a property within a district.22  When the taxing
district is created for a special, temporary purpose and the district is
a mere instrumentality for collecting the tax by spreading the cost
according to assumed benefits, relief will be afforded the taxpayer
and the district invalidating if: (1) The effect is to impose a grossly
unjust or unequal burden on some of the property taxed,23 or (2) if
there are no benefits resulting directly, specially, or peculiarly from
the improvement.
24
But when benefits flowing from the district are general, and
district operations permanent, the fact that the benefit to a particular
property may be remote, doubtful, or the burden heavy, will not
entitle relief against an authorized levy.25 Under either scenario,
however, the assessment must not exceed the proportional benefits
as compared to assessments on other lots and tracts affected by the
21 Id. at 825.
22 John M. Starling, Note, Special District Taxation, 13 U. FLA. L. REv. 531 (1960).
2 Id, citing Jinkins v. Entzminger, 135 So. 785 (Fla. 1931).
24 Starling, supra note 21 (citing Martin v. Dade Muck Land Co., 116 So. 449 (Fla.
1928)).
5 Starling, supra note 21 (citing Jinkins v. Entzminger, 135 So. 785 (Fla. 1931)).
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improvement. In addition, the manner of the assessment may vary
within the district, as long as the amount of the assessment for each
tract is proportional to the benefits received.26
C. Conditioning Assessments
1. Incidental Benefit Districts
The benefits derived from the assessment may be structured so
that some areas receive incidental use, without requiring those
incidental users to be assessed." In Charlotte County v. Fiske,
the Second District Court of Appeal upheld an assessment for
garbage collection being challenged because not all county residents
were assessed while all residents did benefit from a clean county.29
The court found the argument unpersuasive, stating that even though
some properties benefitted from garbage service, only those
properties actually using the service were assessed.3°
Under Charlotte County, an assessment may withstand scrutiny,
even if that assessment is purposely designed to incidentally benefit
non-assessed property owners. For example, suppose City X desires
increased police protection3" and is willing to assess itself to pay the
increased associated costs. Further suppose, that police have
substations in City Y, an affluent neighborhood, and City Z, an area
with a high crime rate. Charlotte County could allow City X to use
officers from City Z to protect X. Resulting in increased police
presence in Z because the police would have to go through Z to
reach City X.
I Under both the Nollan rational basis and assessment benefit tests,
incidental benefit zones may withstand constitutional scrutiny. First,
under Nollan, the conditioning event need only be based upon
demonstrating a rational nexus between the condition and the
legislative purpose. Under the X, Z hypothetical, the nexus is
2 South Trail Fire Control District, Sarasota County v. Town Hall, 273 So. 2d 380,
386 (Fla. 1973).
V Charlotte County v. Fiske, 350 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
n 350 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
29 Id at 580-581.
30 Id at 581.
31 This example assumes that police protection is a valid assessment purpose.
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demonstrated through the benefits afforded City Z under the plan.
The second part of the test is much easier to demonstrate because the
Florida Supreme Court has already validated an assessment district
which incidentally benefits another area.12  Therefore, it would
appear that conditioning the assessment upon providing incidental
benefits would survive constitutional muster.33
2. Benefit Swaps
Taken to the extreme, can an assessment be structured so the
benefits flow to X and Z without "assessing" both X and Z? One
option may involve some type of "benefit swap" between the two
areas. In one from of swap, one area would bear the cost of
assessment and in return receive some comparable benefit.
The theory of reciprocal obligations and burdens was upheld in
cases involving eminent domain. In State v. City of Tampa, 4 and
Herr v. City of St. Petersburg,5 the Florida Supreme Court upheld
a plan by the City of Tampa to pay condemnees in substitute
properties, rather than cash.36
The plan was assailed on two grounds. First, it was asserted that
the plan violated the constitutional provision forbidding any city to
use its full faith and credit for the benefit of any corporation,
association, institution or individual.3 7 Second, it was claimed that
the plan constituted an impermissible bartering of the police
power.38
The Florida Supreme Court held as long as the city is receiving
property at least equal in value to the property to be conveyed, the
city has not violated the constitutional mandate. 9 Since there were
32 Charlotte County, 350 So. 2d at 581.
33 It should be noted, however, that conditioning an assessment upon providing
incidental benefits may undergo additional review requiring judicial balancing of the benefits
and burdens imposed upon the landowner against the benefit to the public health, safety and
welfare. See Starling, supra note 21, at 541-544.
3 113 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1959).
35 114 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1959).
3 See, e.g., Id.
3 City of Tampa, 113 So. 2d at 845; City of St. Petersberg, 114 So. 2d at 173-174.
City of Tampa, 113 So. 2d at 846; City of St. Petersberg, 114 So. 2d at 175.
39 City of Tampa, 113 So. 2d at 845; City of St. Petersberg, 114 So. 2d at 173-174.
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to flow reciprocal benefits, burdens and obligations, and the
transaction accomplished municipal purposes, the city had not
bartered away its police powers.4°
If a benefit swap is the condition to enacting a special benefit
district, the swap, like substituted compensation, should be
constitutionally valid, since each area is to receive benefits of equal
values while also being strapped with equivalent burdens. In order
to do so, however, the substance and not the form must be
scrutinized. Further, under the Nollan test, a nexus between the
condition and the purpose for the condition could be demonstrated.
The logical extreme to this scenario would be for City X to be
assessed and provide a benefit to both City X and City Z. In return,
City X would receive a benefit already available in City Z. This
would also be constitutional as long as the property within each
benefit district receives equivalent benefits. As the Florida Supreme
Court stated: "The term "benefit," as regards [the] validity of
improvement assessments, does not mean simply an advance or
increase in market value, but embraces actual increase in money
value and also potential or actual or added use and enjoyment of the
property. 
41
Unfortunately, the Meyer court does not focus upon detriment,
but instead focuses upon benefit received. The court in essence,
ignores one of the fundamental aspects of assessments: That the
benefit received and the amount of assessment must be equivalent.42
The equation does not contemplate the situation in which the benefit
received exceeds the amount of assessment. As a result, if the
amount of assessment is not as great as the amount of benefit
received, the case law derived from the traditional challenge to an
assessment may be inapplicable."
Even under current law, however, the plan is viable because
under the plan, the determination as to the amount of assessment
cannot be made until after a determination as to the amount of
40 City of Tampa, 113 So. 2d at 846; City of St. Petersberg, 114 So. 2d at 175.
41 Meyer v. City of Oakland Park, 219 So. 2d 417, 420 (Fla. 1969).
42 Treasure Island v. Strong, 215 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1968); Atlantic C.L.R. Co. v.
Gainesville, 91 So. 118 (Fla. 1922).
43 Treasure Island, 215 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1968); Cape Development Co. v. Cocoa
Beach, 192 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 1966); Ft. Meyers v. State, 117 So. 97 (Fla. 1928).
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benefit has been made." The legislature could determine differing
values for the same benefits received resulting in differing
assessments for essentially the same benefits.45 This value benefit
disparity could allow the legislature to "fix" assessment
determinations. Since these determinations are legislative
functions" which are conclusive both on property owners and the
courts, unless palpably arbitrary, grossly unequal and confiscatory,
or devoid of any reasonable basis as to be essentially an abuse of
power,47 they will not be disturbed if fairly debateable." Thereby
undermining the requirement that assessments and benefits be
equivalent.
Would the legislative act, however, withstand constitutional
muster? It appears so. The Florida Supreme Court held that
apportionment of special assessments within a district by the
legislature is a proper function of lawmakers and that a legislative
finding of benefits cannot be reviewed judicially unless it is so
devoid of any reasonable basis as to be essentially arbitrary and an
abuse of power.49
While the court addressed the provision of benefits within a
single district, the court's holding is certainly analogous to the
assessment swap. Each is a benefit to property and each is the
result of legislative determination. Therefore, each should enjoy
judicial equality.
3. Benefit Pools
A third alternative is to establish assessment "benefit pools."
These pools serve as receptacles for benefit points earned by
providing benefits to another area and would allow for bartering of
Treasure Island, 215 So. 2d at 477; Cape Development Co., 192 So. 2d at 772.
45 South Trail Fire Control District v. State, 273 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1973); Hays v.
Tampa, 154 So. 687 (Fla. 1934); Richardson v. Hardee, 96 So. 290 (Fla. 1923).
46 Lot Numbers 1685 v. Defuniak Springs, 174 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1937); Treasure Island,
215 So. 2d at 478.
47 State Board of Supervisors v. Warren, 57 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 1951); Bannerman v.
Cats, 85 So. 336 (Fla. 1920).
48 Meyer v. Oakland Park, 219 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1969); Rosche v. Hollywood, 55 So.
2d 909 (Fla. 1952); Martin v. Dade Muck Land Co., 116 So. 449, 467 (Fla. 1928).
49 See Starling, supra note 21, at 544.
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assessment benefits. Like the "swap," the pools allow the benefits
to be provided at the most efficient rate by allowing for decreased
cost due to wide-scale improvement.
For example, City X needs its streets repaved. City X has ten
miles of street and the paving cost is ten dollars per mile. Cities Y
and Z also need their streets repaved, however, they can not currently
afford to repave and an assessment is out of the question. To
accomplish the project, City X would assess its landowners for the
cost of the entire project and in return the landowners would receive
assessment credits from Y and Z for future benefits of equivalent
value.
There are of course several constitutional restraints on the use of
such a pool. First, since the right to receive future benefits is a
legislative condition, the conditioning event (receipt of reciprocal
benefits) must be definite and certain to occur.50 Even if definite
and certain to occur, however, a constitutional taking may occur if
the benefits are not received in a timely manner.51
Several cases do shed light on the subject. In Anderson v. City
of Ocala,52 the Florida Supreme Court upheld an assessment for
work already performed. In Davidson v. New Orleans,53 the
Supreme Court upheld an assessment made prior to the provision of
benefits. The assessment amount was estimated and judicially
approved. The Court held that as long as due process requirements
are satisfied in making the assessment, the assessment is valid.
Several state courts have held that unless the question of time is
specially or impliedly dealt with by legislation, the time when the
assessment is to be made rests with the discretion of the assessing
authority.' 4 The Florida Supreme Court, however, has yet to decide
whether an assessment may be predicated upon the receipt of future
benefits. Unfortunately, as in Meyer, all current decisions do not
focus upon when the benefits are received, but rather concentrate
50 Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 88 (Fla. 1956). See also, Herr v. City of St.
Petersburg, 114 So. 2d at 174 (Fla. 1959).
s See Treasure Island v. Strong, 215 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1968); 70A AM. JUR. 2d
Special or Local Assessments § 25 (1987).
52 91 So. 182 (Fla. 1922).
53 96 U.S. 97 (1877).
48 FLA. JUR. 2d Special Assessments § 11 (1984); 70A AM. JUR. 2d Special or
Local Assessments § 13 (1987).
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upon the timing of an assessment. Therefore, it would appear, under
Anderson, that as long as benefits are eventually afforded to the
landowner, the determination of when those benefits will attach is a
legislative function which will not be disturbed absent legislative
abuse.5
A second issue presented by pooling is whether assessment rights
are transferrable. The United States Supreme Court recognized that
legislatively created rights may be transferrable in the landmark case
of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.56 In Penn
Central, the Supreme Court upheld New York City's Landmark
Preservation Law which prohibited the destruction of historic
landmarks and neighborhoods by denying building permits. In place
of building permits, developers were granted development rights
which were transferrable to other properties. 7
The Court found that no taking had occurred, stressing that in a
wide variety of contexts the government may execute laws or
programs that adversely affect recognized economic values without
its action constituting a "taking. '58 In deciding whether a particular
governmental action has affected a "taking," the character of the
action and nature and extent of the interference with property rights
are focused upon, rather than discrete segments thereof. 9 Since
property rights were not substantially affected due to the granting of
transferrable rights, 60 the legislative validity of the permit denial
was upheld.61
55 See supra notes 43 - 45.
56 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Several other state courts have made similar findings, e.g.,
Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 720 P.2d 528 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); West Montgomery
County Citizens Association v. Maryland - National Capital Park & Planning Comm., 522
A.2d 1328 (Md. 1987); Fred F. French Investigating Co. v. New York, 350 N.E.2d 381
(N.Y. 1976).
57 Such rights may be used to increase the density or uses of other properties. For
a general description of Transferable Development Rights (TDR's) see David Alan Richards,
Downtown Growth Control Through Development Rights Transfer, 21 REAL PROP. PROB.
TR. L.J. 435 (1986); Londa Bozung and Deborah J. Alessi, Recent Developments in
Environmental Preservations and the Rights of Property Owners, 20 URB. LAw. 969 (1989).
58 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-125.
59 Id. at 130-131.
60 Id. at 135-137.
61 Id. at 125.
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The concepts of Penn Central are applicable to the pooling of
benefit rights. Thus, as long as the benefits are enacted to promote
the general health, safety and welfare of the citizens and
the assessed party will eventually receive a benefit, the pool
arrangement should be valid.
It is important to note two distinctions between Penn Central and
the instant scenario. First, Penn Central involves the legislative body
and a private developer while the instant matter involves only
legislative bodies. This should not inhibit the availability of pooling
rights, but rather enhance it. As noted earlier, actions between
governmental units are often given more favorable treatment by the
courts.62 Secondly, the rights transferred under TDR's are known
and fixed at the time the permit is denied, while benefits pooled
under the pooling scheme may not be known until some time in the
future.6 This distinction may enhance a temporary taking argument
for the landowner. The assessed landowner will be unable to
determine the extent of property rights affected until the pool rights
are assigned to his property.64
While a valid attack, the challenge cannot be judicially reviewed
until damages can be ascertained, which cannot be done unless the
entire transaction is examined.' 5  Therefore, a challenge is not
viable until benefits are allocated. Additionally, damages may only
be recoverable if there is a disparity between benefit and assessment
which could possibly be offset by the landowners pro rata share of
all pooled benefit rights available at the time of the challenge.' If
the value of these future rights are equivalent to the amount of the
alleged taking, the entire challenge in essence is moot. In short,
"benefit pools" are a viable use of assessment benefits as long as the
pool rights attach and are used within a reasonable time period.
62 See supra note 34.
6 As discussed supra, this may present some constitutional difficulties.
6 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987).
6 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-131.




The enactment and use of any of the assessment alternatives is
dependent on legislative action; action which must be weighed
against influences upon the political process itself. A vote for one
of these assessment uses may be the political process itself. A vote
for one of these assessment uses may be political suicide for a
legislator since many of the benefits sought to be provided can be
implemented through general taxation. As federal cutbacks continue,
however, and states limit the ability of local government to raise
revenues,68 legislatures will be forced to explore alternative methods
of benefit provision.
The discussed assessment uses are also subject to other attacks.
Primarily, the benefits could be provided by simply assessing the
landowner. There is no need to use a pool or swap. While a valid
point, it fails to recognize several important reasons for using an
alternative assessment method. First, use of an assessment method
may result in lower overall assessments because a large project is
involved, thereby reducing cost. Secondly, it may be less expensive
to use an assessment method than to provide the benefit by raising
taxes. Finally, use of an assessment method may allow the
legislature a method to provide benefits to impoverished areas
without taxing the residents.
69
IV. CONCLUSION
Each of the assessment methods discussed in this article seeks to
build or rebuild infrastructure by using current resources in a more
67 It should be noted that a monetary special assessment for an impoverished area
will merely add to the poverty problems. Since many minority households are rented,
assessment costs are simply passed on to the tenant through increased rent.
SFla. Const. Art. I (forbidding state property tax); Fla. Const. Art. VII § 5 (a)
(forbidding state income tax); Fla. Const. Art. VII § 9 (b) (limiting ad valorem taxes to 10
mills).
6 It has been argued that minority representation is continuously subject to political
gerrymandering, thereby undermining the political strength of minorities. See Peter H.
Schick, The Thickest Thickett: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325 (1987).
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economical fashion. Each method faces similar obstacles, legislative
action, landowner and judicial challenges. Whether or not viable,
they represent a means of providing needed benefits without raising
taxes.
